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Faller: Propositional- and illocutionary-level evidentiality in Cuzco Quechua

Propositional- and illocutionary-level evidentiality in Cuzco Quechua
Martina Faller
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen
This paper discusses the differences between two grammatical means of conveying evidential contrasts in Cuzco
Quechua, and argues that evidential interpretations can arise
on different levels of meaning. In Quechua, evidential
contrasts are encoded on the illocutionary level by a set
of evidential enclitics. Evidential interpretations also arise
with the past tense marker -sqa. These, it will be argued,
are not encoded by -sqa but arise indirectly from an additional spatial meaning component, which requires that
the described eventuality be located outside the speaker’s
perceptual field at topic time. It is hypothesized that the
distinction between illocutionary-level and event-level evidentiality is of cross-linguistic relevance.
1. Introduction
This paper discusses the differences between two grammatical means of conveying evidential contrasts in Cuzco Quechua (referred to as simply Quechua in the following), and
argues that evidential contrasts can arise on different levels of meaning.1 In Quechua,
evidential contrasts arise on the illocutionary level, as well as within the proposition. Evidentiality is in this paper defined as the linguistic encoding of the speaker’s grounds for
making a speech act, which in assertions amounts to the speaker’s type of source of information, i.e. how the speaker acquired the proposition expressed p. Evidentiality, under
this definition, is a relation between the speaker and p.2 The primary system for marking
evidentiality in Quechua consists of the following three enclitics: -mi (allomorph -n), encoding best possible grounds (BPG) -si (allomorphs -s, -sis), encoding reportative evidence,
and chá, encoding conjectural evidence. Their meaning in assertions is paradigmatically
illustrated with the examples in (1).3 These enclitics are not obligatory, and sentences with1

I would like to thank the participants of SULA2 for their interesting comments and discussion. Some of
the data presented in this paper were collected during my dissertation field research, which was partly funded
by NSF grant BCS—9980223.
2
This is both a narrower and wider definition than previous ones. It is narrower in considering evidentiality
to be a category distinct from epistemic modality, whereas some authors assume that the two form a single
category, e.g. Chafe (1986), Palmer (1986). Arguments for making this distinction can be found in van der
Auwera and Plungian (1998), Faller (2002), de Haan (1999). It is a wider definition than previous ones in
allowing evidentiality to be marked in types of speech acts other than assertions. This is necessary because
in Quechua (and other languages) evidentials can occur in content questions (but not in yes/no-questions).
3
Abbreviations: 1: first person, 1 O: first person object, 2: second person, 3: third person, 3 S /2 O: third
person subject/second person object, ABL: ablative, ACC: accusative, BEN: benefactive, BPG: best possic 2003 Martina Faller
Jan Anderssen, Paula Menéndez-Benito, and Adam Werle, eds. The Proceedings of SULA 2,
Vancouver, BC: 19–33. GLSA, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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out one implicate the same evidential value as sentences with -mi, as shown in (1d), (Faller
2002).
(1)

a. Para-sha-n-mi.
rain-PROG -3- BPG
p=‘It is raining.’
EV : sp sees that it raining
c. Para-sha-n-si.
rain-PROG -3- REP
p=‘It is raining.’
EV : sp was told that it is raining

b. Para-sha-n-chá.
rain-PROG -3- CONJ
p=‘It is possibly raining.’
EV : sp conjectures that it might be raining
d. Para-sha-n.
rain-PROG -3
p=‘It is raining.’
(implicated) EV: sp sees that it is raining

In addition, the two Quechua past tense suffixes give raise to an evidential contrast: the
suffix -sqa encodes that the speaker did not perceive the described eventuality; whereas
sentences containing the suffix -rqa implicate that the speaker has BPG (Faller 2002). These
suffixes are illustrated in (2).
(2)

a. Para-sha-rqa-n.
rain-PROG - PST-3
p=‘It was raining.’
implicated EV: speaker saw it rain

b. Para-sha-sqa.
rain-PROG - NX . PST
p=‘It was raining.’
EV : speaker did not see it rain

In this paper, I argue that the evidential enclitics are illocutionary modifiers, i.e. they
operate above the propositional level (see Faller (2002)), whereas the past tense suffix
-sqa operates within the proposition and on the event. -sqa, it will be argued, does not, in
fact, encode an evidential value according to the definition of evidentiality adopted here,
because it does not encode a relation between the speaker and p. Instead, it is argued
to locate the event outside the speaker’s perceptual field at topic time. From this spatial
definition of the meaning of -sqa its evidential interpretation follows: a person who has no
perceptual access to an event, cannot have direct evidence, i.e. (s)he must have acquired p
in an indirect way.
For reasons of space, the argument that the evidential enclitics are illocutionary modifiers will only be developed for the Reportative -si in section 2 (for the full argument see
Faller (2002)). Section 3 compares the past tense -sqa to the Reportative, and on the basis
of the observed differences argues that -sqa is not of the same type as the evidential enclitics, but operates on the event. In section 4, an analysis of -sqa as locating the event both
temporally and spatially will be presented. The main claims are summarized in section 5.
ble grounds, CISL: cislocative, COM: comitative, CONJ: conjecture, CONT: continuative, EUPH: euphonic,
FUT : future, ILLATIVE : illative, HORT : hortative, LIM: limitative, LOC: locative, NEG : negative, NMLZ :
nominalizer, NX . PST: non-experience past, PROG: progressive, PST: past, PL: plural, REFL: reflexive, REP:
reportative, SURP: surprise, TOP: topic
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2. The Reportative -si as an illocutionary modifier
The use of the Reportative -si is illustrated by the examples in (3). This enclitic is used in
folktales, (3a), as well as for talking about everyday events, (3b), including news reported
on the radio, (3c). In each of these examples, the enclitic -si indicates that the speaker was
told the information conveyed.
(3)

a. Huk kutin-si huk forastero Pinchimuro ayllu-manta ch’in pajonal-kuna-pi
one time-REP one forastero Pinchimuro village-ABL quiet pajonal-PL - LOC
puri-sha-sqa.
walk-PROG - NX . PST
‘p=One time a forastero from Pinchimuro was walking through quiet pajonales.’
EV : sp was told p
(Condori Mamani 1996:39)
b. Mana-s phalay-ta ati-n-chu [. . .]
not-REP fly-ACC can-3- NEG
p=‘It cannot fly.’
EV : sp was told p

(conversation)

c. Pay-si riki oficialmente riki kay cargu-ta umalli-nqa
she-REP right officially
right this office-ACC head-3 FUT
p=‘She will head this office, right.’
EV : sp was told p

(radio)

In the following I will provide four arguments for analyzing -si as an illocutionary operator, i.e. as not pertaining to the proposition expressed: (i) -si has always wide scope over
negation, (ii) -si does not contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed,
(iii) -si cannot occur in embedded clauses, and (iv) -si gives rise to an ambiguity in content
questions. In these respects, -si behaves just like illocutionary adverbs such as fortunately
and honestly (see also Faller (2002)).
(i) Scope of negation. Illocutionary operators such as certain adverbs cannot be in the
scope of propositional operators. Thus, the illocutionary adverb fortunately in (4) is not
affected by negation, i.e. (4) cannot be interpreted as It is not fortunate, that it is raining
today.
(4)

Fortunately, it isn’t raining today.

Likewise, the Reportative -si is always outside the scope of negation, and (5) cannot receive
the evidential interpretation in (ii).
(5)

Ines-qa mana-s qaynunchaw ñaña-n-ta-chu watuku-rqa-n.
Inés-TOP not-REP yesterday sister-3- ACC -neg visit-PST-3
p= ‘Inés didn’t visit her sister yesterday.’
EV : (i) speaker was told that Inés did not visit her sister yesterday
(ii) # speaker was not told that Inés visited her sister yesterday

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020
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(ii) Truth conditions. Illocutionary operators do not contribute to the truth conditions of
the sentence they occur in. Thus, if someone wanted to deny the truth of (4) by saying
that’s not true, they would only be denying that it isn’t raining, not that the speaker of (4)
thinks that that is fortunate. Likewise, challenging the truth of (5) only affects the claim
that Inés visited her sister yesterday, not that the speaker of (5) was told this. Thus, (6a) is
not a felicitous challenge of the truth of (5), whereas (6b) is.
(6)

a. Mana-n chiqaq-chu. #Mana-n chay-ta willa-rqa-sunki-chu.
not-BPG true-NEG
not-BPG this-ACC tell-PST-3 S /2 O - NEG
‘That’s not true. #You were not told this.’
b. Mana-n chiqaq-chu. Manta-n-lla-ta-n
watuku-rqa-n.
not-BPG true-NEG
mother-3- LIM - ACC-mi visit-PST-3
‘That’s not true. She only visited her mother.’

(iii) Embedding.
(7)

Illocutionary operators cannot be embedded, as shown in (7).

If it is, *fortunately, not raining, we will go.

The same restriction holds for the Reportative -si :
(8)

Mana-(*si) para-sha-n-chu chayqa ri-sun-chis.
not-REP
rain-PROG -3- NEG then go-1 FUT- PL
‘If it is not raining we will go.’

(iv) Ambiguity in content questions. When certain illocutionary adverbs occur in questions, they become anchored to the addressee, instead of to the speaker as in assertions.
This is illustrated for honestly in (9).
(9)

Honestly, who did Pilar visit?

The speaker of (9) is not asking his or her question claiming that (s)he is being honest, but
rather asks the addressee to be honest when giving the answer. A similar, but more complex
phenomenon can be observed with the Reportative -si. As shown in (10), content questions
with -si are ambiguous, -si may be anchored to the speaker or to the addressee.4
(10)

May-pi-s kunan ka-sha-n-ku.
where-REP now be-PROG -3- PL
‘Where are they now?’
EV: (i) speaker asks on behalf of someone else (-si anchored to speaker)
(ii) speaker expects answer to be based on reportative evidence (-si anchored to
addressee)

4

See Faller (2002) for an analysis of this ambiguity.
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The above observations are difficult to account for if -si is analyzed as a propositional
operator, but are predicted by its analysis as an illocutionary operator.5 Faller (2002) analyzes -si as changing the speech act type ASSERTION of declarative sentences to the (new)
type PRESENTATION . The sincerity conditions associated with this type are shown in (11).
(11)

-si:

PRESENT(p)
SINC={Bel(sp, q)

∧ q = ∃sp3 .Say(sp3 , p)}

A speaker using -si does not have to believe p to sincerely PRESENT p, but there must
be someone else (sp3 ), who said p. If there is no other person who said p, the sentence with
-si will not necessarily be false, but only insincere.
Similar arguments as the ones presented above for -si can be made for the other two
evidential enclitics (see Faller (2002)). I assume in the following that all three evidential
enclitics are illocutionary operators that modify the sincerity conditions of assertions.
3. Past tense -sqa is not an illocutionary operator
The past tense suffix -sqa also gives rise to evidential interpretations, and it is therefore
a plausible hypothesis that it is of the same type as the evidential enclitics, i.e. an illocutionary modifier. In this section, I argue that it is of a different type. Before providing the
arguments, the different interpretations -sqa gives rise to are illustrated.
The uses of -sqa:
• Reportative. Of the two past tense suffixes, -sqa is the one typically used in folktales. It is also used for reporting past events in every-day live, including news reporting, and tends to co-occur with the Reportative -si when the speaker has learned
the information from other people.
(12)

a. Chay-si chay p’asna-qa uña ukukucha-ta wachaku-mu-sqa
this-REP this girl-TOP cub bear-ACC
give.birth-CISL - NX . PST
‘In this way, this girl gave birth to a bear cub.’
(Cusihuaman 1976:170)
b. Hinaspa chay-pi-s [. . . ] hap’i-ra-pu-sqa-ku.
kinsa-manta.
then
this-LOC-si [. . . ] grab-HORT- BEN - NX . PST- PL three-ABL
‘Then, there, they, grabbed (him), three of them.
(radio)
b. Wawa-cha ka-sha-qti-lla-y-raq-si
tiyu-y-qa wañu-pu-sqa.
baby-DIM be-PROG - NMLZ - LIM -1- CONT- REP uncle-1- TOP die-BEN - NX . PST
‘My uncle died when I was still a baby.’
(Cusihuaman 1976:170)

• Inference from results. -sqa is used for describing past events the result of which
the speaker has observed.
5

Faller (2002) provides arguments for not analyzing the meaning contributed by -si as a conversational
implicature (it cannot be cancelled) or as a presuppositions. Let me also point out that none of these tests by
itself shows conclusively that -si must be an illocutionary modifier. But the illocutionary analysis makes it
easier to account for these data, and taken together they provide strong evidence in favor of the illocutionary
analysis.
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a. Q’iru p’aki-ku-sqa-n.
cup break-REFL-NX . PST- BPG
‘The cup broke.’
b. Marya-qa hamu-sqa-n.
Marya-TOP come-NX . PST- BPG
‘Marya came.’

The example in (13a) is felicitous in a situation in which the speaker finds the pieces
of the broken cup, but did not witness the breaking itself, and (13b) may be uttered
by someone who answers the door, sees that it is Marya, and announces her arrival to
other people in the room. Here, the speaker uses -sqa, because (s)he did not observe
the actual coming, but only its end result, Marya’s being at the door. -sqa can only
be used for inferences from (the observation of) an end state to the event leading up
to it.
• Mirative. Mirativity refers to the linguistic encoding the speaker’s surprise or unexpectedness (DeLancey 2001). -sqa can also express mirativity.
(14)

Kay-pi-(má) ka-sha-sqa
Marya-qa.
this-LOC - SURP be-PROG - NX . PST Marya-TOP
‘Marya is here!’

The speaker of (14) is surprised at finding that Marya is here. Often, mirative -sqa is
combined with the surprise enclitic -má. There are two important differences between this and the reportative and resultative uses of -sqa: (i) the speaker has direct
evidence for the described eventuality e, and (ii) it may have present time reference; mirative examples like (14) would usually be uttered at the time the speaker
is perceiving the surprising situation. Closely related is the use of -sqa for making
compliments, which does however not necessarily involve an element of surprise.
The speaker of (15) does not convey that they had thought the addressee was a bad
cook.
(15)

Lawa-yki-qa sumaq-mi ka-sqa.
soup-2- TOP nice-BPG be-NX . PST
‘Your soup is very tasty!’

• Dreams. -sqa can be used to report dreams (without the Reportative enclitic -si), as
illustrated in (16).
(16)

Musqhuy-ni-y-pi mama-y rimapaya-wa-sha-sqa
dream-EUPH-1-LOC mother-1 speak-1 O-PROG - NX . PST
‘In my dream, my mother was speaking to me.’
(Cusihuaman 1976:170)

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/sula/vol2/iss1/3
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In the following, only the evidential, i.e. the reportative and resultative, uses of -sqa will
be discussed.6 Through a comparison with the indirect evidential enclitics I will argue that
they and -sqa are not of the same type.
First note that a sentence can only receive a single evidential value. As shown in (17),
two different evidential enclitics cannot co-occur in the same sentence.7
(17)

*Pilar-wan-mi Inés-wan-si Qusqu-pi tiya-sha-n.
Pilar-COM - BPG Inés-COM - REP Cusco-LOC live-PROG -3
‘Pilar and Inés live in Cusco.’
intended EV: I have direct evidence for Pilar, and reportative evidence for Inés.

If -sqa were an evidential, we would expect that it can co-occur with the Reportative
-si as well as with the Conjectural -chá, but it should not be able to co-occur with the
enclitic for best possible grounds -mi. However, the data contradicts this prediction:
(18)

a. Para-sha-sqa-n.
rain-PROG - NX . PST- BPG
‘It rained.’
EV : sp was told/infers from result that it rained
b. Para-sha-sqa-s.
rain-PROG - NX . PST- REP
‘It rained.’
EV : sp was told that it rained.
c. * Para-sha-sqa-chá.
rain-PROG - NX . PST- CONJ
intended EV: sp conjectures that it rained

-mi can, but -chá cannot co-occur with -sqa. This strongly suggests that -sqa is not an
evidential. Naturally, any non-evidential analysis of -sqa, including the one to be proposed
below, will also have to explain the pattern in (18). I will not do this in this paper for
reasons of space. Let me point out, however, that, in contrast to an analysis of -sqa as an
evidential, the analysis to be proposed does not in and of itself impose any co-occurrence
restrictions with the evidential enclitics.
A second argument against analyzing -sqa as an evidential of the same type as the indirect evidential enclitics is their different interpretations in content questions. As discussed
in the previous section, the Reportative -si gives rise to an evidential ambiguity. The relevant example is repeated in (19a). As illustrated in (19b), the Conjectural gives rise to a
question that does not expect an answer, i.e. it is a rhetorical question.
6
7

I assume that the mirative use of -sqa is a pragmatic extension of its evidential use.
This is not a morphosyntactic restriction, since the same enclitic can occur twice:

(i) Qaynunchay p’unchay-taq-sis huk wayna arma-ntin-sis kan-man ka-ra-n.
yesterday day-CONTR-si one guy weapon-with-si be-COND be-PST 1-3
‘And yesterday there was a guy with a weapon.’

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020
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a. May-pi-s kunan ka-sha-n-ku.
where-REP now be-PROG -3- PL
‘Where are they now?’
EV: (i) speaker asks on behalf of someone else (-si anchored to speaker)
(ii) speaker expects answer to be based on reportative evidence (-si anchored to
addressee)
b. May-pi-chá kunan ka-sha-n-ku.
where-CONJ now be-PROG -3- PL
‘Where are they now?’
EV: speaker does not expect the addressee to know the answer; “Who knows
...”

In contrast, questions with -sqa are neither ambiguous nor rhetorical.
(20)

May-pi ka-sha-sqa-ku.
where be-PROG - NX . PST- PL
‘Where were they?’

The speaker of (20) does not ask on somebody else’s behalf, nor does (s)he expect the
answer to be based on a particular type of evidence. (20) is also not rhetorical, an answer
is expected.
Furthermore, -sqa differs from the Reportative -si in that -si gives rise to de re/de dicto
ambiguities, but -sqa does not. This is illustrated in (21).
(21)

a. Estados Unidos-pa rey-ni-n-si
Peru-man hamu-sqa.
United States-GEN king-EUPH -3- REP Peru-ILL come-NX . PST
p=‘The king of the United States came to Peru.’
EV = sp was told that p
b. Estados Unidos-pa rey-ni-n
Peru-man hamu-sqa.
United States-GEN king-EUPH -3 Peru-ILL come-NX . PST
p=‘The king of the United States came to Peru.’
EV = sp was told/infers that p

The speaker of (21a) may believe him- or herself that there is a king of the United States (de
re), or (s)he may not (de dicto). However, the speaker of (21b), in which the Reportative
enclitic -si is omitted, must believe that there is a king of the US for the assertion to be
sincere.
These differences between -sqa and the two indirect evidential enclitics suggest that it is
of a different type. Recall that I have defined evidentiality as a relation between the speaker
and the embedded proposition p. The data discussed suggests that -sqa does not establish
such a relation, i.e. it is not an evidential according to my definition of evidentiality. The
task now is to account for the evidential interpretations it gives rise to in a different way.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/sula/vol2/iss1/3
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4. Past tense -sqa as a spatio-temporal operator on events
In this section I will develop an analysis of -sqa that does not assume that -sqa encodes an
evidential relation between the speaker and the proposition expressed p. Instead, I propose
that -sqa is part of p. More precisely, I analyze -sqa as an operator on the event e, which
locates e both in time and space. The evidential interpretations of -sqa can be derived from
its spatial meaning.
The temporal meaning of -sqa is simply past tense, i.e. it locates the reference or topic
time tR before the time of speaking tS (Klein 1994). I assume that untensed sentence
radicals denote properties of eventualities. For example, the sentence radical Marya fall
denotes the set of events e in which Marya falls:
(22)

Marya fall: λe.fall(Marya)(e)

Tense operators take sentence radicals as their argument and specify a particular relation
between tR and tS . For simplicity, I assume that tR is the first argument of a tense operator;
tR may either be supplied by temporal frame adverbs such as yesterday or by the context.
For a more elaborate compositional analysis of tense and frame adverbs see, for example,
Abusch (1998) and Condoravdi (2002). Thus, the temporal meaning of -sqa PAST can be
represented as (23).
(23)

PAST:

λtR λP λe[P (e) ∧ tR ≺ tS ]

To derive, for example, the sentence Marya fell under the assumption that the context specifies tR =this morning and tS =now, PAST takes this morning and the sentence radical in
(22) as its arguments:
(24)

PAST(this

morning)(Marya fall):
λe[fall (Marya)(e) ∧ this morning ≺ now]

Note that (24) does not tell us how the time of the event—which I assume to be given
by its run-time τ (e) (Krifka 1989)—relates to either tS or tR . Following Klein (1994) and
Kiparsky (2002), I assume that τ (e) is related to the time of speaking only indirectly, via its
relation to tR , and that it is aspect that determines the relation between tR and τ (e). In the
absence of an overt aspectual operator, I assume that τ (e) is a subinterval of tR by default
(cf. Kiparsky (2002)). Moreover, the event variable in (24) must be existentially quantified,
and I assume that this is done by the general process of existential closure. Thus, the final
meaning of the sentence Marya fell is (25).
(25)

∃e[fall (Marya)(e) ∧ this morning ≺ now ∧ τ (e) ⊂ this morning ]

To this temporal meaning, I propose adding a spatial meaning, such that -sqa requires
that e did not take place within the perceptual field of the speaker during topic time. Since
the speaker did not perceive e, (s)he cannot base a proposition about e on direct evidence.
I define the perceptual field of a person at time t as the set of locations l that (s)he has perceptual access to, where perception may involve any of the senses, not just sight. Consider
for example (26).
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020
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(26)

Marya-qa urma-sqa-(s).
Marya-TOP fall-NX . PST- REP
p=‘Marya fell.’

-sqa specifies that the event of Marya’s falling happened outside the speaker’s perceptual
field at tR . It follows that the speaker does not have direct evidence for the proposition
p=‘Marya fell’ and must have learned p in some other, indirect, way. In (26), the manner in
which p was acquired is overtly specified by the Reportative enclitic -si, though this is not
obligatory.
To make the relationship between the location of e and the perceptual field of the
speaker during tR precise, I define two spatio-temporal trace functions, e-trace and P-trace.
e-trace maps an eventuality e onto its space coordinates for each time interval t included in
its run time τ (e). P-trace maps the speaker sp onto his or her perceptual field during his or
her “run-time” (i.e. life-time). These functions are defined in (27).
e-trace(e) = {< t, l > | t ⊆ τ (e) ∧ AT(e, t, l)}
P-trace(sp) = {< t, l | t ⊆ τ (sp) ∧ PERCEIVE(sp, t, l) }

(27)

The predicate AT(e, t, l), which is modelled on Verkuyl and Zwarts’ (1992) predicate AT, is
true iff the eventuality e takes place at location l at time t. PERCEIVE (sp, t, l) is true iff sp
perceives l at t. Given these two functions, the meaning of -sqa can now be defined as in
(28).
-sqa: λtR λP λe.P (e) ∧ tR ≺ tS ∧
¬ ∀ < t, l > [t ⊆ tR ∧ < t, l > ∈ e-trace(e) −→ < t, l > ∈ P-trace(sp)]

(28)

Given (28), the meaning of (26) can be calculated by applying -sqa to the sentence
radical Marya fall, adding the default aspectual relation and applying existential closure.
The result is given in (29).
∃e[fall (Marya)(e) ∧ this morning ≺ now ∧ τ (e) ⊆ tR ∧
¬ ∀ < t, l > [t ⊆ tR ∧ < t, l > ∈ e-trace(e) −→ < t, l > ∈ P-trace(sp)]]

(29)

It is useful to visualize the relationship between e-trace and P-trace with the help of a
time-space diagram (the horizontal axis orders time intervals t, the vertical axis locations
l). For example, Fig. 1 illustrates a situation in which e-trace is completely outside P-trace,
and thus fulfills the spatial truth conditions of -sqa.
L
P-trace
l2

e-trace
l1
T
tR

now

Figure 1: Time-space diagram of e-trace and P-trace
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The situation depicted in Fig. 1 is representative of the reportative uses of -sqa, as in
the examples (12). In each of these examples, the described event took place at a location
to which the speaker did not have perceptual access during topic time.
In the resultative uses of -sqa the described eventuality also takes place outside the
speaker’s perceptual field, but its result falls within it. This situation can be diagrammed as
in Fig. 2
L
P-trace
l2

e-trace
l1

result
T
tR

now

Figure 2: Result state overlapping with P-trace

Fig. 2 depicts the situations described by the examples in (13). The result state that is
perceived by the speaker are the broken pieces of the cup in (13a), and Marya’s being at the
door in (13b). From the perception of these states the speaker can infer the events leading
up to them, and assert these using -sqa.
To summarize briefly, I analyze -sqa as a past tense marker which also specifies the
spatial location of e in relation to the speaker such that e is outside the speaker’s perceptual
field. No reference is made to the type of source of information by which the speaker
acquired the proposition p describing e. Nevertheless, the fact that -sqa locates e outside the
perceptual field gives rise to the necessary inference that the speaker has indirect evidence
for p. It is important to note, however, that this inference is not part of the meaning encoded
by -sqa. That is -sqa gives rise to evidential interpretations without being an evidential in
the sense adopted in this paper.
Note that the definition of -sqa allows for the possibility that part of e-trace is contained
in P-trace. -sqa can indeed be used in such cases. An example is the following. Assume
that I had visited my friend Mario who lives in a different town, and that a few weeks later
I’m asked how Mario is doing. I can then reply with (30).
(30)

Mario-qa allin-mi ka-sha-sqa.
Mario-TOP good-BPG be-PROG - NX . PST
‘Mario was/is fine.’

This is unexpected given that I have direct evidence that he was fine during my visit.
However, what is crucial for the use of -sqa in such situations is that there has passed some
time between the period of direct evidence and the time of speaking, during which I have
no evidence for the truth of p. Thus, for (30) to be felicitous, I should not have any evidence
about Mario’s well-being in the weeks that have passed between my visit and my uttering
(30). This situation can be diagrammed as in Fig. 3.
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2020
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L
P-trace
l2

e-trace
l1
tR

T
now

Figure 3: Partial overlap of e-trace and P-trace

As shown in Fig. 3, for the truth conditions of -sqa to be fulfilled, it is necessary that
the topic time tR extends beyond the visit, i.e. the period of direct evidence. If tR were
co-extensive with the visit, e-trace would be fully contained in P-trace during topic time,
and the truth conditions of -sqa would not be met. That tR does indeed extend beyond the
visit itself is shown by the fact that it is not possible to explicitly set tR to the time of the
visit:
(31)

* Mario-q wasi-n-pi
ka-sha-qti-y
allin-mi ka-sha-sqa
Mario-GEN house-3- LOC be-PROG - NMLZ -1 good-BPG be-PROG - NX . PST
‘When I was at Mario’s house, he was fine.’

Furthermore, when asked what the difference is between (30) and (32), containing -rqa,
consultants say that in (32) the speaker conveys that Mario has not been fine since.
(32)

Mario-qa allin-mi ka-sha-rqa-n.
Mario-TOP good-BPG be-PROG-PST-3
‘Mario was fine.’

In contrast, with (30) the speaker is taken to convey that Mario is still fine now. This also
suggests that the reference time for the sentence with -sqa extends beyond the visit itself.
In fact, it suggests that tR extends up to now. In this use then, -sqa comes close to being a
universal perfect, and a better gloss might be Mario has been well or even Mario is well.
It is well known that perfect markers often also mark evidential distinctions (Anderson
1982), and one might therefore consider analyzing -sqa as a perfect. However, this use of
-sqa appears to be more marginal than its clearly past tense uses, and I therefore maintain
that -sqa is a past tense (see Faller (2003) for a more detailed argument).
In summary, the truth conditions proposed in (28) for -sqa account for the range of
interpretations sentences containing -sqa can receive, i.e. they allow for reportative and
resultative interpretations, as well as for cases of partial direct evidence. These evidential
interpretations are a consequence of the spatial meaning component, and arise without
giving -sqa the status of a genuine evidential.
Given that I have used four types of “tests” to argue that the Reportative -si is an illocutionary operator in section 2, one would now want to apply these tests to -sqa to show that
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/sula/vol2/iss1/3
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it is indeed part of the proposition expressed p as I have claimed. In particular, one would
want to show that -sqa falls under the scope of negation and is affected by a denial of the
truth of an assertion by another person, as well as that it can be embedded (I have already
shown that -sqa does not lead to ambiguities in content questions). To start with the latter,
it turns out that -sqa can also not be embedded in the antecedent of if-clauses, at least not
in the case of hypothetical if-clauses such as (33).
(33)

*Mana para-sqa-chu
chayqa ri-sun-chis.
not-REP rain-NX . PST- NEG then go-1 FUT- PL
‘If it didn’t rain we will go.’

But this does not necessarily mean that -sqa is not part of p. An alternative explanation is
to assume that -sqa is a realis marker.8 There is independent evidence in support of this
assumption, for example, the impossibility of -chá and -sqa occurring in the same clause
mentioned in section 3. Moreover, -sqa cannot co-occur with the so-called conditional
mood marker -man, whereas the neutral past tense -rqa can:
(34)

Para-sha-n-man ka-rqa-n/*ka-sqa.
rain-PROG -3- COND be-PST-3/be-NX . PST
‘It might have rained.’

It is thus a matter of further work to argue in detail for the assumption that -sqa is realis.
Regarding the question of whether -sqa can be in the scope of negation and outside challenges, the proposed analysis predicts that the spatial meaning of -sqa should fall within
their scope. This is indeed the case, though perhaps not entirely unproblematic. Consider
(35).
(35)

Mana para-sqa-chu
not rain-NX . PST- NEG
‘It did not rain’

If we assume that the sentence negation denies the existence of a raining event, then
it follows that there was no raining event outside the perceptual field of the speaker—nor
was there such an event within the perceptual field. However, the analysis also predicts that
it should be possible to just negate that the raining event took place outside the speaker’s
perceptual field, i.e. this sentence should be true if there was a raining event within the
perceptual field. This is to my knowledge not a possible interpretation of negative sentences
with -sqa. Again, it is a matter of further research to determine the scoping possibilities of
-sqa with respect to other propositional operators. The important observation here is that
-sqa can occur in the scope of negation, but the evidential enclitics cannot.
8

This is not a possible explanation for the impossibility of the evidential enclitics occurring in if-clauses.
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5. Conclusion
In the preceding sections I have shown that Quechua possesses two types of operators that
give rise to evidential contrasts. There is a set of evidential enclitics which encode an
evidential relation between the speaker and the proposition expressed on the illocutionary
level. In addition, there is the past tense marker -sqa which leads to interpretations of
indirect evidence. I have argued that these interpretations are not due to -sqa encoding an
evidential relation between the speaker and the proposition, and I have proposed an analysis
of this marker as an operator which locates the eventuality described both temporally and
spatially. It is the spatial meaning of -sqa, which requires that the described eventuality be
outside the speaker’s perceptual field at topic time, which gives rise to the observed indirect
evidential interpretations without actually encoding these interpretations.
The Quechua suffix -sqa is not the only one of its kind in a cross-linguistic perspective; many languages have tense/aspect markers with the same or similar clusters of meanings described for -sqa in this paper (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986, Chafe and Nichols 1986,
Johanson and Utas 2000, Dendale and Tasmowski 2001, Tatevosov 2001). These markers have been analyzed in different ways by different researchers, but it is to be hoped that
those markers that truly have the same range of meanings can be given a uniform analysis. I
therefore put forth as a research hypothesis that at least some of these markers are amenable
to an analysis along the lines proposed here for -sqa, i.e. that their evidential interpretations
are not encoded but arise from a more basic spatial meaning. Ultimately then, I claim, we
have to distinguish between true evidentiality, which I define as a linguistically encoded
relation between the speaker and the proposition expressed, and evidential interpretations
that arise only indirectly on the basis of non-evidential encoded meaning aspects.
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